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In Europe, one of the instruments at the Network Manager’s (NM) disposal to tackle
demand-capacity imbalance is to impose ground, i.e. Air Traffic Flow Management
(ATFM), delays to flights. To compensate for anticipated delays and improve on-time per-
formance, Aircraft Operators usually embed a buffer time in their schedules. The current
practice for allocating ATFM delays does not take into account if flights have any remaining
schedule buffer to absorb ATFM delay and reduce delay propagation to subsequent flights.
Furthermore, the policy presently employed is to minimize ATFM delays, an order of mag-
nitude of half a minute per flight, while propagated delays are approximately ten times
higher. In this paper, we explore the possibility to control ATFM delay distribution in a
way so as to minimize delay propagated to subsequent flights, but also to increase flights’
adherence to airport slots at coordinated airports. To this aim, we propose a two-level
mixed-integer optimization model to solve en-route demand-capacity imbalance problem
and further improve airport slot adherence. The rationales behind the research are drawn
from practical experience, while the model proposed is compatible with the one currently
being used by the NM, making it easy to implement. We test the model on two real-world
case studies and conduct ex post analysis to test the effects of violation of model assump-
tions on results. The results show that it is possible to use the proposed methodology to
lower delay propagated to subsequent flights and at the same time to improve airport slot
adherence. In addition, they suggest that the current regulatory settings aiming to mini-
mize ATFM delay minutes, as well as operational implementation thereof, are neither nec-
essarily fully aligned with the desires and operating goals of Aircraft Operators, nor they
improve the predictability of operations in the network.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Airport and airspace congestion is an inherent problem in Europe, often resulting in substantial flight delays, re-routings
and even cancelations (EUROCONTROL PRC, 2015). Congested airports aim to strategically (six months in advance) establish
demand-capacity balance through airport slots, i.e. by allotting predefined time periods for an aircraft to land or take-off
(Cook, 2007). The central figure of European Air Traffic Management (ATM), the Network Manager1 (NM), also has a processbs.ac.uk
al).
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NM strategic planning for a day of operations starts several months in advance, involving collaboration between Air Navigation
Service Providers (ANSPs), as local or regional ATM and Air Traffic Control (ATC) units, airports and Aircraft Operators (AOs).
Regardless of timely planning, majority of congestion problems get resolved on the day of operations (tactically) by means
of demand management (DM) measures (Jovanovic´ et al., 2014). One of the usual Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) mea-
sures is to apply a regulation, i.e. to limit the maximum rate of aircraft entering either a regulated volume of airspace or airport.
Flights subject to regulation are assigned new take-off times through ATFM (time) slots, in an automated process using
Computer Assisted Slot Allocation (CASA) system. Some of the regulated flights are delayed on the ground (ATFM delay), to tem-
porally spread the demand to align it with the capacity available (for details, see Cook, 2007). In case of a single capacity-
constrained resource, Castelli et al. (2011) show that the First Come First Served2 (FCFS) principle applied in CASA minimizes
ATFM delay and argue that a different (optimal) slot allocation is available in the cost domain, i.e. when aspects other than delay
duration are considered too. The latter stands when ATFM delay is considered solely, that is, observed and measured ‘tactically’
from the NM perspective.
On the other hand, different AOs may perceive the same ATFM delay in a different manner. Namely, AOs embed time buf-
fers (slack or padding) in their schedules (Fig. 1), with primary intention to strategically compensate for (a portion of) tac-
tically anticipated delays, while maintaining the on-time performance of flights and the operational reliability of schedules
(Wu, 2005). ‘Strategic’ flight time includes gate-to-gate time plus schedule buffer and as such is advertised by AOs; at slot
coordinated airports strategic schedules are usually aligned with airport slots (Cook, 2007). ‘Tactical’ flight time accounts for
the gate-to-gate time only; this information for a flight becomes available when AO submits a flight plan (FPL) to the NM,
usually on the day of operations. AOs also have the flexibility to shift their tactical departure times before strategic ones, thus
increasing strategically allocated buffer.
The important property of schedule buffer is that it can absorb departure delay to a certain extent and reduce delay prop-
agation to subsequent flights (AhmadBeygi et al., 2008). CASA does not take into account if regulated flights have any
(remaining) schedule buffer to absorb ATFM delay and thus prevent potential delay propagation to subsequent flights. This
research primarily examines the possibility to systematically utilize schedule buffers in the ATFM slot allocation process to
reduce delay propagation to subsequent flights. At the same time, we aim to align tactical and strategic schedules at slot
coordinated airports to improve airport slot adherence to protect scarce capacity resources of affected airports. We propose
a two-level mixed-integer optimization model for ATFM slot allocation to minimize delay propagation at the first level, and
finding a solution which maximizes airport slot adherence at the second level. The objective of the research is to account for
stakeholders’ different perspectives of congestion problem, in terms of business and operational needs, and bring the pro-
posed methodology closer to dealing with real-world instances of congestion problem.
Before the framework for modelling and formalization of model is explained (Section 3), a background of congestion
problem in Europe is provided in Section 2, focusing on different delay perspectives and the present issue of adherence to
airport slots. The model is tested using the real-world data and results are presented in Section 4, followed by discussion
and proposed directions for further research (Section 5). We draw conclusions in Section 6.2. Background – policy and practice
2.1. Different delay perspectives and resulting implications
The NM reports 0.61 min average en-route ATFM delay per flight in 2014, for the total traffic of 9.6 million flights, of
which 3.2% were affected by ATFM en-route delays (EUROCONTROL PRC, 2015). Central Office for Delay Analysis (CODA)
in Eurocontrol reports that AOs experienced 0.4 min en-route ATFM delay per flight in 2014 (EUROCONTROL CODA,
2015). This discrepancy may arise from both different perspective of delay and different methodology used to measure it:
the NM calculates planned departure delay, while AOs account for ATFM delay they have actually experienced at departure
(EUROCONTROL CODA, 2015). On the other hand, primary or root delays, i.e. delays due to ATFM regulations, weather, etc.,
were 5.4 min in 2014 (EUROCONTROL CODA, 2015). Reactionary delays, also known as ’knock-on’ or ’propagated delays’ are
delays which are transferred from a previous flight of the same (rotational) or a different (non-rotational) aircraft, generally
resulting from primary delays. Reactionary delays added 4.3 min more to sum up to total of 9.7 min average delay per flight
from all-causes (EUROCONTROL CODA, 2015). Although of different order of magnitude, ATFM delay comprises a share in
primary, thus propagated delay, and Eurocontrol Performance Review Commission - PRC (2015) aim to better understand
the ATM contribution towards delay propagation, as well as to identify potential strategies to deal with it. We provide a brief
insight into regulatory environment to better grasp the drivers for operational decision making of ANSPs and the NM regard-
ing ATFM delays.
To support, inter alia, on-time operations, European Commission launched the Single European Sky (SES) initiative aiming
at the modernization of Europe’s ATM to provide better services (SESAR Consortium, 2012). SES high level (political) goals
are expressed and interpreted through the strategic performance objectives for four Key Performance Areas (KPAs): safety,2 FCFS basically means that a flight which is planned to enter the regulated location earlier has priority over flights intended to use it later (for details, see
Cook, 2007).
Fig. 1. Flight planning timeline (adapted from Wandeler, 2014.).
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through Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and benchmarked against SES Performance Targets laid down in SES Performance
Scheme (European Commission, 2010, 2013). One of the binding performance targets for the NM and ANSPs is the average
en-route ATFM delay per flight, adopted as the KPI for ‘capacity’ KPA (European Commission, 2011). Both the NM and ANSPs
are therefore expected to meet the imposed SES Performance Scheme ATFM delay targets. In 2014, for instance, the direct
NM contribution was almost one million minutes of ATFM en-route delay savings (0.09 min per flight on average), out of
which 150,000 min of delay reduction was achieved via more direct routings (EUROCONTROL, 2015a). Both the NM and
ANSPs involve significant resources to explore a range of potential ATFM measures to utilize available capacity, before con-
sidering to regulate the demand (EUROCONTROL NMOC, 2016). This sometimes leads to implementation of so called scenar-
ios3 by ANSPs, usually through re-routings of flights, to avoid excessive ATFM delays (EUROCONTROL NMOC, 2016). The number
of such scenarios more than doubled since the beginning of the SES Performance Scheme implementation: 2076, 3371 and
5226,4 in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively.
AOs unsurprisingly argue that they should be in a position to choose between re-routing and accepting a delay; from their
perspective, re-routings are merely seen as an instrument to bring down ATFM delay figures to meet ANSP delay targets
(EUROCONTROL, 2015b). Further, AOs have already raised a concern regarding the delay metrics used in SES Performance
Scheme since those focus on ATFM delay which is of different order of magnitude compared to actual all-cause delay
(Van Der Veldt, 2015). One could argue that the latter delay is primary concern for AOs business, while the former is binding
for capacity providers, resulting in divorced delay phenomenon perspectives.
Understanding that ATFM delay savings is one of the drivers in capacity providers decision making process, we first esti-
mate the effects of the current policy and practice which minimizes ATFM delay of regulated flights (the NM perspective) on
propagated delays (AO perspective). This will serve as a benchmark against our approach and proposed model which rather
focuses on minimizing delay propagation.
2.2. Airport slot adherence
Although there are no airport-related SES performance targets at the network level presently, a number of services and
solutions for better airport-ATM integration and exploitation of airport capacity are envisaged with the SES initiative (SESAR
Consortium, 2012). In the context of our paper, particularly relevant is EUROCONTROL Centralised Service 1 (CS1): Flight
Plan and Airport Slot Consistency Service (FAS) (EUROCONTROL, 2014a). The aim of CS1-FAS is to check the consistency
of flight plans against airport slots on a centralised basis; this will result in better exploitation of airport capacity and3 Scenarios are ATFM solutions to capacity bottlenecks or specific operational needs of an ANSP aiming at offloading congested areas by re-routing of flights
or limiting the highest flight level that can be planned for a flight (EUROCONTROL NMOC, 2016).
4 Data is available through EUROCONTROL Demand Data Repository (DDR): http://www.eurocontrol.int/ddr service or through EUROCONTROL ATFCM
statistics service at the OneSky Online Extranet EUROCONTROL portal https://ext.eurocontrol.int/. Both services serve as data sources for this study; we refer to
them as DDR and ATFCM Service further in the text.
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gic) planning and (tactical) operations with respect to agreed and allocated airport capacity is not linked, respectively not
taken into account during tactical operations (EUROCONTROL, 2014a). Adamson (2015) presents significant benefits for
AOs at small Greek airports upon introducing airport slot monitoring coupled with ATFM measures which were taking cor-
rect airport slots into account. CS1-FAS envisage sending warnings to AOs, and even rejection of FPLs, in case of airport slot
non-adherence; we complement the concept by proposing an approach to increase airport slot adherence in cases when
arriving and/or departing flights are affected by regulation, i.e. ATFM delay.
2.3. Previous theoretical contributions and a way forward
A comprehensive review of mathematical modelling and various formulations of demand-capacity imbalance problem is
presented in Agustín et al. (2010) and a more recent summary of trends and opportunities in the area of demand and capac-
ity management is given in Barnhart et al. (2012). We briefly reflect on selected previous contributions.
Primary focus of our research is to demonstrate applicability of proposed methodology using real-world examples of
demand-capacity imbalance problem in Europe: the case when a single capacity resource is constrained, taking into account
network as a whole. Tošic´ et al. (1997) propose a binary integer programming model to solve an en-route sector capacity
shortfall, by minimizing cost of ground delays and re-routings. Ground delays are generally perceived safer and less costly
solution compared to holding aircraft in the air (Liu and Hansen, 2013) while re-routings are observed as a mean of reducing
ground delays (and associated costs thereof) by utilizing neighbouring uncongested en-route sectors (Jovanovic´ et al., 2014).
Castelli et al. (2011) propose a market-based ATFM slot allocation to minimize the overall cost of delay, and demonstrate cost
benefits of such approach using a real-world case where all the flights are subject to a single regulation and CASA slot allo-
cation as a benchmark. Likewise, our model builds on CASA, with the difference that we stay in ‘delay domain’, i.e. we min-
imize propagated delay rather than delay cost per se. The reason for this is practical, as it is easier to follow the logic behind
the model and directly compare the results against the current policy (Andreatta et al., 1997), as we use the same delay met-
rics. Flow manager decides using time as a criterion (Leal de Matos and Powell, 2003), as the AOs are reluctant to reveal, or
even not in a perfect position to calculate, delay cost for each flight (Castelli et al., 2011); the future User Driven Prioritisation
Process (UDPP) concept will offer a possibility to AOs to indicate a priority order of flights affected by delays (SESAR
Consortium, 2012). Nevertheless, we estimate the delay costs of proposed solutions using individual cost functions, as we
are able to differentiate between strategic cost of schedule buffer and tactical cost of delay for each flight (Cook and
Tanner, 2015).
Vranas et al. (1994) used ground slack time to limit coupling of consecutive flights, accounting indirectly for excessive
delay due to late arrivals in the objective (cost) function. They found that optimal solutions with and without coupling con-
straint are almost the same when all flights have the same cost function (homogenous demand), unrealistic, but well-
established practice of Federal Aviation Administration in the US. A number of papers also focus on large-scale instances
of the network and computational times (Bertsimas and Patterson, 1998; Bertsimas et al., 2008; Churchill et al., 2009;
Agustin et al., 2012) applying a combination of various DM actions (ground delays, re-routings, speed control and flight can-
cellation) to minimize aggregated delay (cost). A central ATM decision maker decides on a set of DM actions to satisfy capac-
ity and coupling constraints, assuming that aircraft rotations and turnaround times are known in advance. Churchill et al.
(2009) notice that there is a limitation for using the coupling of consecutive flights in practical model applications, not
because of increasing computational times, but due to the fact that the information of aircraft rotations is proprietary
and airlines are not likely to disclose them. In our approach, we share the perspective of the NM in Europe: the schedule
information is available for one leg of an aircraft rotation and there is no link available to the subsequent leg. Alternatively,
we explicitly distinguish between strategic and tactical schedules and use ATFM delay as an instrument to reduce delay
propagation. Furthermore, we observe demand as heterogeneous recognizing the different scheduling practices among AOs.
The concept of in-house utilisation and reallocation of flights’ schedule buffers to reduce delay propagation has already
been shown as potentially beneficial to AOs (AhmadBeygi et al., 2008). In our research we adapt and apply the methodology
at a network (central) level; on a related note, de Villemeur et al. (2011) analyse (cost-benefit) the effects of central planning
of schedule buffers, instead of the current market based. As a digression, once airborne, flight could complementary compen-
sate some departure delay, be it in terms of minutes or cost savings. For instance, Cook et al. (2009) suggest using dynamic
cost index (speed vs. fuel burn vs. environment trade-off) concluding that, in certain cases, even small delay recoveries can be
worth the fuel penalty in terms of increasing arrival predictability and minimizing disruption at the airport (see also Delgado
and Prats, 2012). We expect a similar trade-off to arise between equity and efficiency following the application of our con-
cept, having in mind that the current FCFS policy is shown to be equitable in terms of ATFM delay minutes distribution (but
not necessarily in the cost domain, see Castelli et al., 2011). This seems to be a widely observed phenomenon; for instance,
Lulli and Odoni (2007) propose a deterministic model for ATFM problem specific for European ATM and notice the same,
therein defined, equity vs. efficiency conflict. A number of papers address equitable resource allocation in the ATM, defining
equity as ‘‘equal outcome” (Transportation Research Board, 2011), considering equity over a period of time (Tošic´ et al.,
1995) or as ‘‘delayers pay principle” (Levinson and Rafferty, 2004). A few studies also consider balancing between efficiency
and equity, for instance, by including both components in the objective function (Glover and Ball, 2013) or bi-level approach
maximizing efficiency first and equity second (Kuhn, 2013). We do not address the equity issue per se in our model, however,
we discuss the consequences of the operational principles applied therein (Section 5). Namely, it would be interesting to see
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straightforwardly clear, especially given the heterogeneous landscape of AOs’ business models in Europe. In the end, equity
might also be seen as largely a matter of perception and metrics used to measure it (Glover and Ball, 2013), so we compare
both delay minutes and estimated cost distribution outcome of the model, being aware that it’s not necessarily those metrics
that AOs find most relevant in this regard. Notably, neither equity, nor terms with similar notions, are explicitly addressed in
the current EC high-level transport policy (Jovanovic´ et al., 2015).
Lastly, we address the practical issue of adherence to airport slots, in case of disturbance of operations due to en-route
sector regulation. A major focus of research regarding airport slots is on airport slot trading (e.g. Pellegrini et al., 2012)
and effects thereof (e.g. Fukui, 2014), slot allocation mechanism (among many, Avenali et al., 2015; Corolli et al., 2014)
and efficiency thereof (Madas and Zografos, 2008; Ranieri et al., 2013). Castelli et al. (2012) propose an airport slot allocation
(deterministic) model, considering the network constraints and matching the departing and arriving slot, in a more equitable
manner. Etxebarria et al. (2013) simulate different prioritization strategies at a network level, one of them being priority for
flights flying to congested airports, but found no benefits compared to FCFS policy. Our focus is on protecting the scarce
capacity resources when some of the flights operating from slot coordinated airports are delayed due to an ATFM en-
route regulation. This approach is also very well aligned with the new SESAR (SES ATM Research) concept ‘Short-Term Air
Traffic Flow and Capacity Management Measures’ (STAM)5 (EUROCONTROL, 2014b).3. Minimizing delay propagation and improving airport slot adherence: two-level optimization model
3.1. Rationale
CODA all-cause delay analysis shows that, after recovering overnight, reactionary delay starts accumulating in the morn-
ing and continuously builds up during the day (EUROCONTROL CODA, 2015). AhmadBeygi et al. (2008) show that flights
delayed in the morning will propagate more delay, suggesting that a flight disrupted early in the day will benefit more sub-
stantially from increased buffer (to absorb disruption) than will a flight disrupted later in the day. This also supports a con-
ventional wisdom that airlines pay more attention to flights’ punctuality in the morning, but focus on transfer passengers in
the evening (Jetzki, 2009); partially due to the high (non-linear) cost of tactical delay, for instance, due to missed passenger
transfers and long delay compensations (Cook and Tanner, 2015). On the other hand, adding schedule buffers increases resi-
lience to delay propagation, consequently increasing airlines’ strategic costs (in a linear fashion). Therefore, AOs are able to
balance between the buffer levels and anticipated tactical delay (Cook and Tanner, 2015). Cook and Tanner (2015) further
argue that strategic costs and tactical costs are not independent, due to costs of reactionary delays: for instance, if no buffers
were used to absorb a portion of delay, the reactionary costs would increase markedly and the tactical costs would be sig-
nificantly higher. A minute of strategic cost of delay is approximately three times lower than a minute of its tactical coun-
terpart, with a historical trend of lowering strategic and increasing tactical unit delay costs (Cook and Tanner, 2015). With
this in mind, our approach which tends to distribute ATFM delay minutes over the (long) schedule buffers sounds reasonable
in the cost domain too, on a system (network) level.
Assuming that majority of early rotations still have schedule buffers at large (de Villemeur et al., 2011), we test the pro-
posed methodology for morning regulations. Note that, as the total delay inevitably builds up through the day and there is
hardly any flexibility in schedules to absorb accumulated delays, it is not clear if the proposed methodology would always be
beneficial to AOs. For evening operations, perhaps passenger-centric methodology for delay assignment (Montlaur and
Delgado, 2015) would better answer AOs needs.
AOs attach great value to their flight planning flexibility and tend to decide on their route and flying times at a rather
short notice; they are obliged to submit a FPL at latest 3 h before the estimated off block time (EOBT), see Fig. 1. This means
that even though coordinated airports strategically balance demand and capacity through airport slots, AOs could still tac-
tically file their EOBT much earlier (or later in case of delay) than strategically planned time of departure (STD). CODA reports
that almost 20% of flights depart 5 or more minutes before STD, 40% arrive 5 or more minutes before scheduled time of arri-
val (STA), with 10% of flights arriving 15 min in advance (EUROCONTROL CODA, 2015). Flexibility to tactically shift desired
take-off time much earlier than strategically planned, thus increasing strategically allocated buffer, could also cause conges-
tion problems at airports already operating at their capacities (EUROCONTROL CODA, 2015). Therefore, in the ATFM slot allo-
cation process, we aim to control ATFM delay distribution in a way so as to bring flights operating from/to slot coordinated
airports closer to their strategic time of operations, i.e. to airport slots.3.2. Problem statement and model assumptions
We define the demand-capacity imbalance problem as follows: for an en-route sector regulation, defined by duration and
declared rate, assign regulated flights to ATFM slots to minimize delay propagated to subsequent flights and maximize air-
port slot adherence, such that each flight is assigned only one ATFM slot and one ATFM slot is assigned to one flight only.5 Basically, STAM are minor spatio-temporal flight profile modifications applied to a few selected flights to reduce complexity of anticipated traffic loads
(EUROCONTROL, 2014b).
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rate of aircraft allowed to enter a regulated location in an hour (Cr). A flight can be assigned to any ATFM slot which ends
after the flight’s estimated time over (ETO) the regulated location. The number of ATFM slots is calculated as (1):N ¼ Crðrend  rstartÞ: ð1Þ
ATFM slots i 2 {1, . . .,N} are defined by their start time Li (2), (3) whereL1 ¼ rstart; Li ¼ Li1 þ 1=Cr; 8i 2 f2; . . . ;Nþ 1g ð2Þ
½Li; Liþ1; 8i 2 f1; . . . ;Ng: ð3Þ
Demand is known a priori: the NM has the tactical schedules based on FPLs and we assume that it also has strategic
schedules. The difference between strategic and tactical schedules for a flight represents strategic buffer (bs). The definition
is in line with methodology used in Jetzki (2009) to estimate strategic schedule buffers per different market segment in Eur-
ope. We denote with bt tactical buffer for a flight f; it represents the flexibility for AOs to shift EOBT before STD (early flight,
bt > 0), thus increasing strategic schedule buffer, or after STD (delayed flight, bt < 0), decreasing strategic schedule buffer.
Finally, we define schedule buffer bf for a flight f as a sum of strategic and tactical buffer (4):bf ¼ ðSTAf  STDf Þ  ðETAf  EOBTfÞ þ bt : ð4ÞNote that when strategic and tactical departure times (STD, EOBT respectively) are aligned, buffer is the difference
between scheduled and estimated time of arrival at gate (STA, ETA respectively), Fig. 1.
ATFM delay dAfi and propagated delay d
P
fi for each flight f and slot i are calculated, respectively by (5) and (6):dAfi ¼ ðLi  ETOfÞþ; ð5Þ
dPfi ¼ ðdAfi  bf Þ
þ
; ð6ÞwhereðxÞþ ¼ x; x  0
0; x < 0

: ð7ÞIf a delayed flight f still arrives earlier than scheduled, we assume that no delay is propagated to the next flight, therefore
dpf is set to zero; otherwise, the delay not absorbed by buffer propagates to the subsequent flight. In practice, 1 min of pri-
mary delay generated on average 0.8 min of reactionary delay in 2014 (EUROCONTROL CODA, 2015); with some variation,
this has been a relatively stable ratio over the years (Cook and Tanner, 2015). We simulate, ex post, the actual effects of ATFM
delayed flights on the subsequent rotation, taking into account potential delay recovery during the turnaround phase.
We assume that strategic schedules and airport slots are aligned (see Fig. 1). Airport slot adherence is defined as the abso-
lute (time) difference between strategic and tactical (ATFM delayed) schedules, separately for departures from and arrivals at
coordinated airports (Eqs. (19), (20)). The realization of flights is assumed as planned. We test the effects on results of vio-
lation of this assumption, i.e. when regulated flights do not depart on time.
3.3. Model
In this section, we propose a two-level mixed-integer programming model to minimize propagated delay and subse-
quently maximize airport slot adherence. We optimize in two steps because our priority is to minimize propagated delay;
slot adherence is only to be improved without increasing overall delay. We focus on a set of regulated flights, observed in the
network composed of airports and sectors with limited capacity, as well as capacity restrictions of a set of regulated en-route
sectors. We use binary matrices to map from an elementary discrete time grid to higher level discrete time grids, correspond-
ing to airport slots, sector slots or regulation slots. A generic mapping matrix is defined as B 2 {0,1}IxT where I is the number
of aggregated slot intervals and T is the total number of periods in the elementary time horizon considered. Bit is equal to 1 if
period t is in time slot interval i; 0 otherwise.
3.3.1. Level 1 – minimizing propagated delay
Given the network under consideration, we propose an optimization model to find per-flight delay (ATFM slot) assign-
ment which minimizes the overall propagated delay, subject to capacity constraints; we refer to this model as MINP. Note
that other non-regulated and regulated (i.e. subject to a regulation other than the considered one) flights sharing the same
network under consideration may affect capacity, but these flights are assumed to be fixed and their impact on capacity is
incorporated in the input parameters (capacities decremented accordingly). The MINP model uses notation as defined in
Table 1:
Table 1
Sets and indices.
Sets and indices
F Set of flights, indexed by f
A Set of coordinated airports, indexed by a
S Set of sectors, indexed by s
R Set of regulations, indexed by r
SR Set of regulated sectors, indexed by sr
Fdepa ; F
arr
a ; Fs Subset of flights departing from airport a, arriving at airport a and using sector s
Parameters
c
!dep
a Capacity vector of departure slots at airport a
c
!arr
a Capacity vector of arrival slots at airport a
c
!sec
s Capacity vector of entry slots at sector s
bf Schedule buffer of flight f
e
!dep
fl Unit vector 2 f0;1gT with 1 in ðtdepf þ lÞ
th
position, where tdepf is the expected departure time period according to schedule (EOBT)
e
!arr
fl Unit vector 2 f0;1gT with 1 in ðtarrf þ lÞth position, where tarrf is the expected arrival time period according to schedule (ETA)
e
!sec
fls Unit vector 2 f0;1gT with 1 in ðtsecf þ lÞth position, where tsecf is the expected entry time of flight f into sector s according to schedule
(ETO)
Bdepa ;B
arr
a Binary matrix mapping elementary time horizon into the aggregated departure and arrival time grids at airport a
Bsecs Binary matrix mapping from the elementary time horizon into the aggregated slots used to count entries at sector s
Bregsr Binary matrix mapping from the elementary time horizon into the aggregated slots used by regulation r on sector sr
Decision variables
ufl Binary variable indicating whether flight f will be delayed by l 2 f0;1; . . . ; lmaxg time units (with lmax representing the maximum delay
that can be assigned to a flight)
dpf Propagated delay for flight f
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dpf P
Xlmax
l¼0
lufl  bf
 !
8f 2 F ð13Þ
dpf P 0 8f 2 F ð14ÞXlmax
l¼0
ufl ¼ 1 8f 2 F ð15Þ
ufl 2 f0;1g 8f 2 F; l 2 f0;1; . . . ; lmaxg: ð16Þ
MINP assigns ATFM delays to flights to minimize the sum of propagated delays (8). Inequalities (9)–(12) are the capacity
constraints for departure airports, sectors, regulated sectors and arrival airports, respectively. Constraints (13) define the
propagated delay of flight f as its ATFM delay minus its buffer. Constraints (14) are the non-negativity requirement for prop-
agated delay variables. Equations (15) state that at most one delay can be assigned to each flight. Finally, constraints (16) are
the binary restrictions for variables ufl.
3.3.2. Level 2 - Optimizing airport slot adherence
At the second level, we seek an ATFM slot allocation, i.e. ATFM delay distribution, to improve airport slot adherence; this
model is referred to as APSA.
The model uses following additional notation:
 Fco : set of flights departing from or arriving at a coordinated airport
 STAf : scheduled time of arrival for flight f
 STDf : scheduled time of departure for flight f
190 N. Ivanov et al. / Transportation Research Part A 95 (2017) 183–197 doptf : optimal propagated delay for flight f , obtained by solving MINP model
 hdepf : variable representing airport slot adherence at departure for flight f
 harrf : variable representing airport slot adherence at arrival for flight f
(APSA):6 For
from ou
7 We
segmen
flights imin
X
f2Fco
hdepf þ
X
f2Fco
harrf ð17Þs.t.(9)–(16)X
f2F
dpf ¼
X
f2F
doptf ð18Þ
hdepf ¼ STDf  tdepf 
Xlmax
l¼0
lufl

 8f 2 Fco ð19Þ
harrf ¼ STAf  tarrf 
Xlmax
l¼0
lufl

 8f 2 Fco: ð20ÞAPSA model aims at finding new delay assignments which maximize airport slots adherence (17) without increasing glo-
bal propagated delay (18). Finally, Eqs. (19) and (20) define airport slot adherence at departure and arrival, respectively. It
should be noted that (19) and (20) can be elegantly linearized; we omitted this step for the sake of clearer position.4. Case study
4.1. Experimental design and data
The main data source used is EUROCONTROL Demand Data Repository (DDR) Service, which provides historical demand
and capacity data, accessed through EUROCONTROL’s Network Strategic Tool (NEST) software (EUROCONTROL, 2016), used
for data processing (see also Jovanovic´ et al., 2014). We use two different morning en-route regulations for model testing and
comparison, Table 2. To get a sense of scope of the instances, we consider 23 airports and 104 sectors for Regulation 1 and 61
airports and 232 sectors for Regulation 2, with several hundred of other regulated and non-regulated flights in both
instances. All the regulated flights were subject to one regulation only, so the FCFS policy should give minimum ATFM delay.
However, CASA is inherently dynamic and coupled with complex rules for exemption or inclusion6 of flights into a regulation,
so the resulting ATFM delay (Table 2) distribution is not necessarily a reproduction of the strict FCFS rule (EUROCONTROL
NMOC, 2016). Therefore, we simulate CASA algorithm to obtain FCFS compatible ATFM delay and ATFM slot allocation (last col-
umn, Table 2) (EUROCONTROL, 2016).
Further, CASA does not take into account wider network constraints, other than those of regulated sector(s)
(EUROCONTROL NMOC, 2016), so CASA solution may violate hard capacity constraints envisaged in our model. To provide
a reasonable result comparison between CASA and our model, we design experiments to include two distinct cases:
1. Infinite network capacity. This is the default CASA setting; we neglect the network capacity constraints to obtain results
with MINP and APSA (we refer to this case as MINPinf and APSAinf, respectively).
2. Limited network capacity. The limited network capacity (airports and sectors) is accounted for. To simulate CASA with
such constraints, we use our model to minimize ATFM delay by substituting propagated delay with ATFM delay in the
objective function (8). We refer to this model as MATFM, the results of which are now directly comparable to MINP
and APSA.
With NEST, we are able to capture the dynamics of the airspace network, e.g. sector opening or closing, and consequent
capacity changes (EUROCONTROL, 2016). We use flights’ sector entry and crossing times for each regulated flight, as well as
for other regulated and non-regulated flights, to estimate loadings of sectors and airports of the (dynamic) network consid-
ered. For sector loads, we use hourly entry counts, i.e. number of flights entering a sector during an hour, as the usual prac-
tice, and equivalent 20 min entry counts for slot coordinated airports.
We use detailed flight trajectories and tactical departure and arrival times of regulated flights, based on latest valid FPL.
We define three schedule buffer distributions to reproduce aggregated high level statistics per different market segment7 ininstance, flights flying from outside the NM/ATFM area of service are not subject to regulation (EUROCONTROL NMOC, 2016); we exempt these flights
r analysis as well (one flight per regulation, so the final traffic samples are 23 and 62, respectively).
categorize AOs based on AO code, airport pair and aircraft model to, as closely as possible, replicate the methodology in Jetzki (2009); if a flight’s
t is not conclusive, we assign the market segment with narrower buffer distribution. For a few non-scheduled (operating by unpublished schedules)
n the larger traffic sample, we assume P2P buffer distribution.
Table 2
Regulation details. source EUROCONTROL DDR.
Reg.
No.
Reg. ID Reference
location
Reg. start Reg. end Rate Nb. of
flights
ATFM Delay
(reported)
ATFM Delay
(simulated)
1 FTE321E LFFFTE 21/11/2014
07:00
21/11/2014
08:00
25 24 243 min 208 min
2 LEP1U106 LECBP1U 06/10/2014
08:20
06/10/2014
10:20
41 63 334 min 295 min
N. Ivanov et al. / Transportation Research Part A 95 (2017) 183–197 191Jetzki (2009): on average, Low Cost (LCC) have 5 min buffer time, Hub&Spoke (H&S) 3 min and 2 min buffer for Point to Point
(P2P) operations. Jetzki (2009) estimates that between 20% and 30% of all flights have their actual gate-to-gate times longer than
published schedules (see Mayer and Sinai, 2003), which seems to be in line with the current state (EUROCONTROL CODA, 2015).
We propose uniform schedule buffer distribution per market segment:
 U[5 min, 15 min] for LCC flights,
 U[4 min, 10 min], for H&S flights and
 U[3 min, 7 min], for P2P flights.
To test the models for each regulation and traffic mix, we run 30 iterations with different buffer samples, drawn from the
distributions defined.
To evaluate solutions of different models, we estimate delay cost per flight as a sum of strategic and tactical delay cost,
using (Cook and Tanner, 2015):
 Linear function for the (sunk) cost of strategic delay – csf, where csf = as  bs;
 Non-linear function for the cost of tactical delay (beyond strategic) – ctf , including reactionary delay cost estimates, where
Bulletctf = a
t  (dAf  bf)2 + bt  (dAf  bf) + ct, if dAf  bf > 0 orBulletctf = 0, if d
A
f – bf 6 0, i.e. if ATFM delay is absorbed by buffer.We rely on detailed at-gate delay costs tabulated in Cook and Tanner (2015) to estimate parameters as, at, bt and ct per
aircraft type, or linearly adjusted costs based on aircraft weight if an aircraft type is not tabulated (see more in Cook and
Tanner, 2015). While it is clear that a flight with positive buffer time already has a starting cost of strategic delay, the same
cannot be stated for a flight with negative schedule buffer. Namely, the reason for the (presently) observed negative buffer is
not known, e.g. is it the AO’s policy or an individual case due to operational limitation and inability to take a shorter route,
hence, it is rather difficult to assign appropriate (starting) cost. Although Cook and Tanner (2015) indicate that such flight
would have markedly increased cost of delay, we observe it as a flight with zero strategic cost and ‘nominal’ tactical cost;
otherwise, we expect that our model would be favoured in comparison with CASA.
For ex post analysis, we first test the effect on results when regulated flights do not depart in line with calculated off block
time (COBT; EOBT adjusted for ATFM delay, Fig. 1). In October and November 2014, 90% of regulated flights departed within
ATFM slot tolerance window (STW) of [5 min, +10 min], meaning that vast majority of regulated flight departed within
15 min of calculated take off time (CTOT).8 To have a wider dispersion, we assume that all the regulated flights depart within
this time window with uniform distribution U[5 min, 10 min] and run 1800 iterations (30 schedule buffer distributions for
both regulations and 30 different samples of ATFM slot adherence minutes).
We also test how much of delay actually propagates to subsequent flights, knowing that some of the inbound delay could
be absorbed in the turnaround phase. Jetzki (2009) uses several indicators for such estimation and we adopt two:
 Schedule padding-ground (SPG), which measures the difference between departing and inbound (primary) delay. This
measure reveals if a flight could recover some delay from delayed inbound flight on the ground.
 Absorbed inbound delay (AID), which measures the difference between actually reported AO reactionary departure delay
of the subsequent flight and inbound (primary) delay of preceding flight. This indicator exactly shows how much of
inbound delay actually propagates to the following flight and is reported as reactionary delay by AOs.
SPG indicator shows that H&S and P2P could recover one minute of delay on the ground on average, while LCC actually
adds more delay during the turnaround phase, albeit from somewhat higher inbound delay (Jetzki, 2009). To reproduce the8 Based on data analysis (source DDR). This statistics is also available in the NM Monthly Adherence to ATFCM Slots reports provided by EUROCONTROL’s
ATFCM service.
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formly in between), and that LCC in best case do not add any new delay and add up to 5 min of new turnaround delay (also
uniformly in between). AID reveals that H&S and P2P could absorb on average 8 min of inbound delay, while LCC report
around 5 min on average (Jetzki, 2009). For AID, we assume U[5 min,11 min] for H&S and P2P, and U[2 min,7 min] for
LCC. Note that Jetzki (2009) estimates SPG and AID for the flights which are delayed on arrival. Since we estimate the impact
of ATM system on reactionary delay, we also don’t consider regulated flights with zero ATFM delay (regulated but not actu-
ally delayed) or delayed flights still arriving before STA.4.2. Results
Without any loss of generality, we assume that EOBT coincides with STD. A sample of schedule buffers is drawn from the
buffer distributions and added to tactical flight time (if a flight has negative schedule buffer, STA will be before ETA). We
draw 30 different samples and run simulations using 4 different models for the two regulations; the results are summarized
in Table 3.
Almost the same results for ATFM delay for CASA (208 min) and MATFM (209 min) for Regulation 1 indicates that the
network capacity represent only a negligible constraint in this case. The same stands for both MINP models, which give
slightly higher ATFM delay (212 min) and lower propagated delay (129 min) compared to CASA (143 min) and MATFM
(155 min). While the difference between tactical and strategic schedules is lower (airport slot adherence is higher) for both
MINPinf and MINP compared to CASA and MATFM, APSA could not further improve the results already obtained in the first
optimization. In case of Regulation 2, on the other hand, the difference between CASA (295 min) and MATFM (354 min)
ATFM delay indicates that some (unregulated) en-route sectors and/or airports have higher demand than declared capacity.
This is an operationally well-known phenomenon called ‘overdeliveries’,9 which we discuss further. MINPinf ATFM slot allo-
cation produces 146 min of propagated delay, while CASA allocation results with 198 min of delay propagation. The equivalent
constrained models yield total delay propagation of 261 min for MATFM and 197 min for MINP. Unlike in Regulation 1, airport
slot adherence was improved by APSA for both MINPinf and MINP, albeit in different ways. Namely, the improvement for MINPinf
comes at the expense of higher ATFM delay, i.e. airport slot adherence improvement equals the increase in ATFM delay. On the
other hand, in MINP case APSA improves airport slot adherence for 8 min and increases ATFM delay for only 1 min.
Turning to the cost domain,10 the average cost of delay (strategic and tactical) for Regulation 1 for MINPinf is 4011EUR
and for CASA 3927EUR. The results indicate that ATFM delays are such that could not be absorbed by (large) schedule buffers,
so the dominant cost driver is non-linear tactical delay (65% of total delay costs in both cases). Since we use tactical costs
with estimated reactionary cost for the level of tactical delay, and not the actual reactionary delay cost (not separately pro-
vided in Cook and Tanner, 2015), these results should be taken with a dose of reservation. On the other hand, the average
delay cost for MATFM was initially much higher at 5282EUR (with 74% tactical cost), while the cost of MINP is the same
as in unconstrained equivalent. These results should also be observed in the light that a different (optimal) delay assignment
in MATFM make possible to reduce the delay costs (since CASA and MATFM globally produce the same ATFM delay figures).
After assessing a couple of different ATFM slot allocations for MATFM, keeping the optimal ATFM delay, we found a solution
with associated cost of 3914EUR, a value reported in Table 3 (note that such second-level cost minimization was not in the
scope of this research).
The Regulation 2 average delay costs are 2761EUR for CASA and 2109EUR for MINPinf. Although this regulation is twice as
long and has almost three times more traffic, the overall delay cost is lower (as well as the average ATFM delay). First, this
means that there are a lot of available ATFM slots (82 ATFM slots and 62 regulated flights, compared to 25 ATFM slots and 24
regulated flights in Regulation 1) to re-allocate flights. Second, traffic mix is different and there are proportionally more LCC
flights with somewhat higher (on average) schedule buffers. The cost shares are the opposite in this case and somewhat dif-
ferent: for CASA 40% of total cost are tactical, but only 20% for MINPinf. For capacity constrained models, MINP gives total cost
of 3476EUR and MATFM initially 4086EUR; after repeating the same second stage cost reduction, we lowered the MATFM
cost to 3506EUR without increasing ATFM delay. The share of tactical and strategic costs is almost the same: 52% of tactical
cost for MINP and 59% of the same for MATFM, as a consequence of higher ATFM delay compared to unconstrained case.
We further compare the delay costs after improving airport slot adherence and we run APSA for MINPinf and MINP for
both regulations. ATFM slot re-allocation for Regulation 1 to find an optimal airport slot adherence improved the delay cost
to 3845EUR, compared to MINPinf only. For the capacity constrained case the delay cost also decreased for MINP to 3974EUR.
Notably, although there was no improvement in airport slot adherence in terms of minutes on average, average costs was
lower in both cases. Contrary, for Regulation 2, improving airport slot adherence comes with higher delay cost for MINPinf
(2483EUR), while in capacity constrained cases, MINP delay cost slightly decreased (3459EUR).9 Reader is referred to: http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Sector_Over-deliveries_and_Overloads and http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Sector_Over-
Deliveries_Due_to_Non-Adherence.
10 To illustrate the cost calculation in this study: for 10 min schedule buffer and 15 min of ATFM delay, at gate total delay costs for Airbus A319 and Boeing
777-200 are 203EUR and 467EUR, respectively. Note that strategic buffer minutes are calculated as delay cost, even if flight is not ATFM delayed by regulation,
since the cost has already ‘occurred’ at strategic level.
Table 3
Average (rounded) propagated (dp) and ATFM (lATFM) delay, airport slot adherence (hdep + harr) minutes and delay costs (EUR).
Regulation 1 Regulation 2
Metrics Delay (min) Adher. (min) Delay cost
(EUR)
Delay Adher. (min) Delay cost
(EUR)
Model dp lATFM h
dep þ harr dp lATFM hdep þ harr
Infinite capacity CASA 143 208 164 3972 198 295 340 2761
MINP(APSA)inf 129 MINP APSA MINP APSA MINP APSA 146 MINP APSA MINP APSA MINP APSA
212 212 132 132 4011 3845 312 316 218 214 2109 2483
Limited capacity MATFM 155 209 138 3914 261 354 300 3506
MINP(APSA) 129 MINP APSA MINP APSA MINP APSA 197 MINP APSA MINP APSA MINP APSA
212 212 133 133 4011 3974 380 381 259 251 3476 3459
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Due to generously wide ATFM slot tolerance window of 15 min and assumed uniform distribution over the period, prop-
agated delay increased markedly in vast majority of iterations for Regulation 1, Table 4 (note that, based on assumed STW
distribution, regulated flights depart 2.5 min late on average). Nevertheless, even in case when delayed flights do not depart
as planned still both MINP and MINPinf propagate less delay dp(STW) than CASA and MATFM. SPG captures the difference
between inbound delay of previous flight and departure delay of the following flight. Due to predominant H&S in the sample
for Regulation 1, in majority of the cases some of inbound delay was absorbed during the turnaround process. Still, total
departure delay of the subsequent flights is lower for both MINP models, compared to CASA and MATFM. The same stands
for AID, with the difference that gap between MINPinf, MINP and CASA becomes negligible, meaning that AOs would report
the same actual reactionary delay.
Results of the second regulation reveal different situation. The ratio dp(STW)/dp for MINP and MINPinf for Regulation 2 is
around 1.8 and 2.1 respectively, meaning that due to ATFM slot non-adherence regulated flights could actually propagate
twice as much delay. The same ratio in all other cases fluctuates around 1.5. This shows that for the Regulation 2 most of
the ATFM delay was already absorbed by (larger on average) schedule buffers and that failing to comply with ATFM slot
could more than proportionally increase delay propagation. However, total propagated delay minutes still favor MINPinf
and MINP over CASA and MATFM. SPG indicator also shows difference compared with the first case – total departure delay
of subsequent rotations is increased, due to predominant presence of LCC in the sample (LCC adds more delay in the turn-
around phase). In line with SPG, AID is also proportionally higher compared to Regulation 1.
Ex post analysis of delay propagation for APSA model reveal very similar results.
Although we were able to improve airport slot adherence with our model for both regulations, assuming on-time oper-
ations and deterministic flight times, all the ex post tests showed high sensitivity to violation of the assumptions. Not sur-
prisingly, wide ATFM slot tolerance window in most of the cases cancels out better performance of our models for both
regulations. Finally, it is not just lowering the adherence to airport slots, but failing to depart on time also led to over-
delivery cases in several sectors and demand was up to 10% higher than the declared sector capacity (assuming compliance
with FPL for all the other non-regulated and regulated flights in the network).5. Discussion
Statistical test show that average delay propagated to subsequent flights is significantly lower for MINP models, com-
pared to ATFM minimization model counterparts (a = 0,05 for all the tests). The same stands and for ex post tests, expect
for the difference between average propagated delay in cases when departure times vary dp(STW) and reported reactionary
delay dp(AID) between MINPinf and CASA for Regulation 1. While ATFM delay for Regulation 2 is significantly higher for
MINP models, it is not the case in Regulation 1. On the other hand, the only statistically significant difference in improving
airport slot adherence is for Regulation 2, in case of limited network capacity.
While in the delay duration domain MINP results surpass the CASA equivalent, the picture is not as clear with delay costs
and some results require further discussion. For Regulation 1, delay costs are generally lower for CASA models. Interestingly,
APSA optimization to improve airport slot adherence minutes actually improved average delay cost, but not adherence min-
utes. For Regulation 2, MINP models have lower total delay cost compared to CASA models. Again, perhaps somewhat
counter-intuitively, improvement of airport slot adherence for MINP gives higher ATFM delay, but lower delay cost. Also,
total delay cost for Regulation 1 is lower for MATFM (constrained case) than for CASA (unconstrained case) slot allocation,
albeit after some computational effort to reduce otherwise very high MATFM delay cost. It should be noted that we use indi-
vidual delay cost function for each flight, explicitly differentiating between linear (strategic) and non-linear (tactical) part.
Further, the aircraft type mix plays important role, as both strategic and especially tactical costs are much higher for large
aircraft than that of the small one. Moreover, tactical costs used in calculation include estimated cost of reactionary delay.
While we are able to estimate reactionary delay per flight, there are no such reactionary delay unit cost values provided in
Table 4
Ex post analysis of delay propagation, STW, SPG, AID indicators (in minutes); rounded averages.
Regulation 1 (MINP) Regulation 2 (MINP)
dp dp (STW) dp (SPG) dp (AID) dp dp (STW) dp (SPG) dp (AID)
CASA 143 202 133 37 198 328 230 65
MINPinf 129 198 120 36 146 304 182 46
MATFM 155 213 143 57 261 389 302 122
MINP 129 198 120 36 197 358 245 73
194 N. Ivanov et al. / Transportation Research Part A 95 (2017) 183–197the literature (Cook and Tanner, 2015). Therefore, we are not in a perfect position to credibly claim which of the twomethods
– to reduce delay propagation or to minimize ATFM delay – performs better in the cost domain.
While certain net benefits seem to be possible at the network level, the distribution thereof (e.g. per AO) might give rise to
equity concerns. Namely, it seems that the benefits in terms or delay minutes and/or cost savings, come at the expense of
distributing the ATFM delay over flights with long(er) schedule buffers. From the ‘‘bearing the burden vs. receiving the benefits”
equity standpoint, the MINP model favours more predictable flights at the cost of those with less predictable times of oper-
ation. However, MINP policy also favours less predictable operations on the other end, meaning that flights with, for yet
unobserved reasons, negative schedule buffer get protected from high(er) ATFM delays. Again, to evaluate the fairness of
such operational implications of the policy applied, one has to know the reasons behind the negative buffer. Is the tactical
gate-to-gate time longer than scheduled due to a limitation in the airspace (e.g. unavailability of ATM system to provide a
shorter route) or it is the policy of an AO to, perhaps, game the system (for instance, to advertise otherwise unfeasible transfer
connections)? As the answer to this intriguing question lies beyond the scope of this paper, we further discuss the potential
consequence on the scheduling practices of AOs, knowing that it usually takes one or two seasons for AOs to adapt their
schedules to compensate for anticipated pattern of delays (EUROCONTROL CODA, 2015).
Increasing flights’ buffer levels in the presence of MINP-like policy would obviously expose flights to potentially higher
ATFM delays in case those flights get regulated. Decreasing buffer levels, on the other hand, would increase the risk of delay
propagation and potentially lower punctuality levels, which could decrease AO’s attractiveness in the market (Suzuki, 1998).
On a related matter, a recent study compares, from passengers’ perspective (welfare), cases where AOs are free to decide on
schedule buffer levels and a situation where a social planner would control for time schedule: the results suggest that there
are some benefits, from social point of view, if schedule buffers are decreased (de Villemeur et al., 2011). Therefore, decrease
in the schedule buffer levels should be supported by airports and airspace capacity suppliers in a manner to enable AOs to
maintain, at least, their punctuality levels. Further improved predictable behaviour of AOs, in terms of adherence to filed
flight plans, should lead to decreasing equivalent buffers on the capacity side, incorporated to protect ATC sectors from
overdeliveries (EUROCONTROL SKYbrary, 2014c). In fact, one ANSP estimated that approximately 5–10% of its capacity is
actually ‘reserved’ to take care of all ‘non-adherence issues’, arising in pre-tactical and tactical stage, and argue that possible
cost saving of a more predictable system could reach 45 million EUR per annum for that provider (EUROCONTROL SKYbrary,
2013). While the application of our model does not increase the cost of capacity provision, estimating potential savings on
the capacity side lies beyond the scope of this paper.
In that context, we present an overview and interrelationship of capacity and demand side contingency (buffer) levels
decision making. Namely, ANSPs plan their capacities weeks and months in advance, with only very limited (and costly) pos-
sibilities to adjust those (especially upwardly) on a short notice, i.e. days in advance of the day of operation (Massacci and
Nyrup, 2015). On the other hand, AOs attach great value to their flight planning flexibility and tend to make their route
choice decisions (submit FPL) typically only several hours before the time of departure (EUROCONTROL, 2014d). There is
thus a mismatch between the predictability for ANSPs and flexibility for AOs, which effectively results in substantial (and
costly) capacity buffers built into ANSPs planning decisions as well (Jovanovic´ et al., 2015). The key challenge therefore
seems to be how to timely coordinate and align demand and capacity side decisions (predictability for ANSPs vs. flexibility
for AOs) to reduce buffer costs on both sides of inequality and incentivize more cost-efficient outcome.
Lastly, MINP strategy effectively seems to increases average ATFM delay and, as such, might not, at least not instantly, be
seen positively from the NM and ANSP, having in mind the SES ATFM delay targets. AO were indeed confronted with more
mandatory re-routings in the last couple of years, arguing that this is the way for ANSPs to cut their ATFM delay figures. But
from the ATM/ATC perspective, these re-routings might be seen as a measure to prevent increased traffic complexity in some
regions or are merely a consequence of some other factors, such as the closure of Ukrainian airspace in 2014 (EUROCONTROL
PRC, 2015). To that end, one natural extension of this research could deal with finding a more cost-efficient balance between
the confronted objectives of various stakeholders involved, including possibly an appropriate adjustment of associated SES
performance targets.6. Conclusions
This research is based on solid practical grounds and as such is tailored to solving real-life congestion problems in Euro-
pean airspace. First, we recognize the different perspectives of delay, namely Aircraft Operators’ (demand side) and ANSPs
N. Ivanov et al. / Transportation Research Part A 95 (2017) 183–197 195and NM (supply side) standpoint. We challenge the current First Come First Served principle to minimize ATFM delay, which,
although equitable, focuses on delays which are an order of magnitude lower than the delays AOs are concerned about, i.e.
propagated delays. Further, we address the problem of airport slot adherence, considering the case when an en-route sector
demand-capacity imbalance affects operations from already congested airports. We propose a two-level model, which takes
advantage of schedule buffers, i.e. flights’ ability to absorb ATFM delay. On the first level of the model, the ATFM slot allo-
cation process minimizes delay propagated to subsequent flights. On the second level, we find such ATFM slot allocation to
improve adherence to airport slots, preserving the optimal propagated delay minutes.
Results from two small/medium-scale real-world case studies show that it is possible to use the proposed methodology to
lower delay propagated to subsequent flights and at the same time to improve airport slot adherence. In addition, we analyse
the problem in the cost domain too. The results suggest that certain delay cost savings are also possible compared to current
ATFM slot allocation. Such improvements usually come at the expense of increased ATFM delay minutes. The results suggest
that the current regulatory settings, namely binding European Air Navigation Service Providers through the Single European
Sky Performance Scheme, to meet ATFM delay targets, are neither necessarily fully aligned with the desires and operating
goals of Aircraft Operators, nor they improve the predictability of operations in the network. To that end, the work is already
underway on investigating possible improvements of system’s cost-efficiency by acting on both supply (adaptive capacity
provision) and demand side of the system (product differentiation with innovative pricing), in a re-designed ATM value
chain, in an attempt to narrow the gap between planning horizons of AOs and ANSPs, which is believed to be one of the
key drivers of cost-inefficiencies in the current system’s setting.
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Appendix A. List of acronymsAID Absorbed inbound delay
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider
AO Aircraft Operators
APSA Optimization model for maximizing airport slot adherence
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management
ATM Air Traffic Management
CASA Computer Assisted Slot Allocation
CODA Central Office for Delay Analysis
CS1 Centralised Service 1
CTA Calculated Time of Arrival
DDR Demand Data Repository
CTOT Calculated Take-off Time
DM Demand Management
EC European Commission
EOBT Estimated Off-block Time
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival
ETOT Estimated Take-off Time
FAS Flight Plan and Airport Slot Consistency
FCFS First Come First Served
FPL ICAO Flight Plan
H&S Hub and Spoke
IATA The International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
KPA Key Performance Area(continued on next page)
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LCC Low Cost Carrier
MATFM Optimization model for minimizing ATFM delay with capacity constraints
MINP Optimization model for minimizing delay propagation
NEST Eurocontrol Network Strategic Tool
NM Network Manager
PRC Performance Review Commission
P2P Point to Point
SES Single European Sky
SESAR Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research
SPG Schedule padding-ground
STAM Short-term Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management Measures
STW ATFM Slot Tolerance WindowReferences
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